Epistemic Injustice

Epistemic Injustice explores the idea that there is a distinctively epistemic kind of injustice - injustice which consists in a wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as a knower. Miranda Fricker distinguishes two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker's word; as in the case where the policedo not believe someone because he is black. Hermeneutical injustice, by contrast, occurs when a gap in collective interpretative resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences. A central case of this sort of injustice is found in the example of awoman who suffers sexual harassment prior to the time when we acquired this critical concept, so that she cannot properly comprehend her own experience, let alone render it communicatively intelligible to others. In connection with each of these forms of epistemic injustice, Fricker develops the idea that our testimonial sensibility needs to incorporate a corrective, anti-prejudicial virtue that can be used to promote a more veridical and a more democratic epistemic practice. Epistemology as it has traditionally been pursued has been impoverished by the lack of any theoretical framework conducive to revealing the ethical and political aspects of our epistemic conduct. Epistemic Injustice shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be fruitfully and forcefully discussed.

an exciting examination of a widespread problem that is rarely discussed in such terms so that it can be understood and communicated, and perhaps, someday, solved, An original and stimulating contribution to contemporary epistemology... There is much to admire in Fricker's book. It is clear, well-written and well-structured. The explanations and arguments are rigorous without being overly technical, and the illustrations are interesting and felicitous. In particular, the book constitutes a striking example of how contemporary epistemology can be enriched by a close attention to our experiences, and of how our understanding of epistemic matters can be deepened through the deployment of ideas from ethics, plitical theory and feminist philosophy. As a result, Epistemic Injustice makes a significant contribution, not just to epistemology, but to all of the disciplines, Fricker's Epistemic Injustice constitutes a systematic attempt to explicate epistemic injustice, articulate the harm it inevitably causes, and expound its remedy. In these goals, Fricker is largely successful. In an often gripping manner, Fricker cuts across philosophical subdisciplines in order to expose some of the more sinister aspects of our epistemic practices. For anyone interested in ethics, epostemology, or social and political philosophy, this is surely a must-read., Miranda Fricker's excellent monograph occupies some relatively uncharted philosophical territory, being 'neither straightforwardly a work of ethics nor straightforwardly a work of epistemology', but instead seeking to '[renegotiate] a stretch of the border between these two regions'...her discussion is outstandingly lucid and persuasive...the book is an admirable reminder of what can be accomplished in under two hundred pages of crisp yet free-flowing philosophical prose. It deserves, and will surely command, widespread attention., ...excellent snd well argued book...This is an important and timely book, argued with care and illustrated with detailed and compelling examples...this is an exemplary discussion of the intersection of knowledge and power.

Miranda Fricker is Reader in the School of Philosophy at Birkbeck College, University of London